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Introduction
Detecting and removing spam messages is a matter of considerable concern to everybody. Spams are ubiquitous in the diversified media of the Internet and we suffer great losses from them; more than 90 percent of all emails have been reported as spam [European 06], and more than 75 percent of all blog entries have also been reported as splog (spam-blog) [Kolari 06 ]. They wastefully consume network resources, unnecessarily lay a burden on server systems, and degrade the accuracy of search results. According to a report of European Commission [Postini 06], spam emails cause damage worths 39 billion euros worldwide. Some countries have placed legal restraints on sending spam messages, but we can not say that these restraints contribute to decrease the number of spam messages. Therefore, it is essential to develop an efficient method that detects spam automatically.
A lot of automatic spam detection methods have been proposed. In the early stages of the history, rule-based methods were widely used, such as compilation blacklists of IP addresses. Then machine-learning-based methods, such as a Bayesian method in [Graham 02 ], have been used; these methods learn probabilistic distributions of some features from given training examples and then judge a new coming email whether it is spam or non-spam, say ham, using the learned distributions. Since it is too costly to create the necessary training data, unsupervised methods have been proposed [Narisawa 06, Narisawa 07, Yoshida 04]. However, to circumvent these methods, spammers have created spam messages in more sophisticated ways, such as word salads. We have to develop a novel method for such a new type of spam.
Spam detection methods are categorized into two groups: non-content-based methods and content-based ones. A blacklist-based filtering is a typical example of the former, and the Bayesian method in [Graham 02 ] is the latter. The algorithms stated in [Narisawa 06, Narisawa 07], which find characteristic substrings in the input documents to recognize spam, are content-based methods, too. The algorithm in [Yoshida 04 ] judges some emails as spam if the number of similar emails is larger than a given threshold value. The algorithm in [ [ Misra 08] present a method that measures the semantic coherence of a document by using Latent Dirichlet allocation. Their idea is based on the premise that a ham contains only a few topics but a spam is made up of many topics. Jeong et al. [Jeong 10 ] present a method that utilizes thesauruses, which regards a message as a spam when the distribution of terms in it differs from the normal distribution of the thesauruses.
In this paper, we study content-based spam detection methods. We assume that spam documents are automatically generated as copies of a seed document with allowing some random modifications [Bratko 06], since we can observe that the aim of spammers is to obtain large rewards with a slight effort and hence they should create a large number of copies. Conversely, the cost of generating a normal document should be relatively high.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose an unsupervised algorithm for spam detection, which we call the spam detection algorithm by Document Complexity Estimation (DCE for short). The key idea is to measure the cost of generating each document by an entropy-like measure, called document complexity. It is defined as the ideal average code-word-length of the document by presuming the input collection excluding the target itself. We expect that the complexity for ham is high, but low for spam. As the document complexity, however, is an ideal measure like Kolmogorov complexity, we substitute an estimated occurrence probability of each document for its complexity. We treat each document as a sequence of letters over a finite alphabet rather than a bag-of-words, and estimate its generation probability from a latent model of the input collection by using Maximal Overlap method proposed by Jagadish et al. [Jagadish 99 ].
Maximal Overlap method [Jagadish 99 ] (MO for short) is a technique for estimating the probability P (x) of a long string x from the probabilities of substrings in x. Although a straightforward method based on the original MO takes more than quadratic time to the target string length, we present an efficient algorithm that runs in linear time to it. We call it as DCE by MO algorithm (DCE MO for short). The keys of the algorithm is full exploitation of the suffix tree and suffix links.
We ran experiments on the real data from popular bulletin boards and some synthetic data. We compared our algorithm with the algorithm stated in [Narisawa 07], which is also an unsupervised method. For the real data, the results of DCE MO are comparable to the algorithm in [Narisawa 07]. Experimental results on the synthetic data showed that DCE MO particularly works well for spam messages based on random replacement, such as word salad and noise spam.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we reviews basic notions. In Chapter 3 we gives our spam detection algorithm. In Chapter 4 we reports experimental results. Finally, in Chapter 5 we conclude this paper.
The previous version of this paper appeared in [Uemura 08]. We revised the representation through the whole paper, and carried out several additional experiments. Since, in the experiments in Chapter 4, there were some bugs in our implementations of our method and [Narisawa 07], we fixed and reevaluated them; therefore, the results in this time are different from those in the previous paper.
Preliminaries

·1 Strings
Let N be the set of all non-negative integers, and let Σ be a finite alphabet. We denote by Σ * the set of all finite strings over Σ. Figure 1 . Formally, the suffix tree for D is a rooted tree, where V is the vertex set, E ⊆ V 2 is the edge set, suf : V → V is a suffix link, lab : E → Σ * is an edge-labeling, and fr : V → N is a frequency counter. All the out-going edges leav- 
·Suffix Trees
Let D = {s 1 , . . ., s M } (M ≥ 0)
·3 Blog and Bulletin Board Spam-Generation Process
We focus on a type of spam called blog and bulletin board spam. Figure 2 shows an outline of a mechanism of spam generation for this type of spam.
We first assume a large collection D 0 consisting of normal documents randomly drawn from the document source D. In typical situations, normal documents are posted by human users. Next we assume a document s 0 is drawn randomly as a spam seed from the spam document source S to generate a collection of spam documents. For an integer K ≥ 1, which is unknown to the users, K approximate copies s 1 , . . ., s K of the seed s 0 are generated with allowing the following perturbations: Mutation Changing randomly selected letters in a document. Crossover Exchanging randomly selected parts of a pair of documents. Word Salad Replacing a set of randomly selected words in a sentence with randomly selected words drawn from other sentences so that it is still grammatically correct, but meaningless. Then, the spam documents We note that our detection algorithm in Chapter 3 is adaptive, and thus it does not need a priori knowledge about the document sources D and S, classes of modifications, and the number K of approximate copies per seed.
·4 Spam Detection Problem
Given an input collection D, we consider the problem of classifying all documents in D into clean or dirty. Formally, our goal is to devise a mapping f : D → {0, 1} that makes classification, where the values 0 and 1 indicate the states that d is clean or dirty, respectively. We call the mapping decision function. We measure the performance of f on D by some cost functions. Let M + be the number of correctly detected spam documents, and M − be the number of nomal documents judged as spam. Let also N + be the total number of spam documents in D. Then, the recall is defined by R = M + /N + and the precision is defined by P = M + /(M + + M − ). The F-score is also defined by F = 2P R/(P + R).
The Proposed Spam Detection Method
·1 Outline of Proposed Method
Our method is parameterized by a given probabilistic model M for probability distribution over Σ * . We assume 
Then, the contribution of d can be measured by how much this addition of d increases the code length of D, which is bounded above by
where θ = θ D and θ = θ D . In the above equations, the inequality in the last row follows from the following observation: A description of D can be obtained by appending
We expect that if the target document d has more copies in D then the contribution ΔL(D, d) will be smaller and thus more likely to be spam. Then, ΔL(D, d) can be estimated by the upperbound
. This is our decision procedure for spam detection:
where γ > 0 is a threshold parameter, which will be given in the following section. We define the document com- (ii) While s = ε holds, we repeat the following process: Find the unique longest substring
If there are more than two substrings with the same overlap, then take the longer one. In case that there exists no such γ i , set α i = ε, β i = γ i to be the initial letter of s, P ( 
·2 Document Probability Estimation by MO Method
We did not mention about the concrete model that the probability of each document follows. In general, to compute the precise value of Q(d | θ ), namely the document complexity of d for D, is quite hard. Therefore, we substitute an estimated occurrence probability of d for its complexity. We denote the substitute probability byQ(d | θ ). We use Maximal Overlap method [Jagadish 99 ] (MO for short) to estimateQ(d | θ ).
MO estimates the probability P (x) of a long string x ∈ Σ * based on a set of shorter substrings appearing in the original string in D as follows. Given string β, the conditional probability for a string α is given by P (β | α) = P (αβ)/P (α). Let s ∈ Σ * be a target string to estimatẽ
In general, for anyQ(· | θ), we can write the probability of the string Proof Let γ i = α i β i (m ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ m) be the maximally overlapping substrings computed in the original MO algorithm. We assume that 
For the zero-probability case (at line 5), we set N := ||D|| − |d|. To see that the moves are always well-defined, we de-
hold by assumption, Then, we can show that (+, +) is only possible state for π(α). Hence,the result immediately follows.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, we show the main theorem of this paper. 
·4 Determining the Threshold
The method DCE MO in Figure 5 takes a decision threshold γ > 0 as a learning parameter. To determine an appropriate value of γ, we first draw the histogram of the document complexity L over unlabelled examples only, and then adaptively define γ to be the point that takes the minimal value in an appropriate range, say, 0.0 ∼ 1.0 (bit).
To justify this selection of γ, we show in Figure 6 the histograms of the document complexity L over all documents in test collection YF4314, which we will state later. In the figure, we see that the distribution of spam documents is concentrated within the range of L = 0.0 ∼ 0.2 (bit) per letter, while that of normal documents spreads over L = 1.0 ∼ 3.5 (bit) per letter and obeys a bell-shaped distribution with the peak around 2.2 (bit). Thus, it is a straightforward strategy to minimize classification risk by taking γ to be the point that takes the minimal value. This justifies the choice of γ. 
Experimental Results
·1 Dataset
We used a test collection of forums from Yahoo Japan Finance * 1 , collected by Narisawa et al.
[Narisawa 07].
The collection consists of four sections of forum data: YF4314, YF4974, YF6830, and YF8473. All posts of each forum are labelled if they are spam or not. Table 1 shows the details of them. In the following experiments, we used only the body texts , including HTML tags.
·2 Method
For simplicity, we call the proposed algorithm by DCE from now on. We implemented DCE and the following methods. Naive method: Let D be the input document set. Then, the Naive method regards a document d as spam if d is a substring of another document in D. That is, Naive is a type of copy-detection method. Alienness measure: Narisawa et al. [Narisawa 07] propose a spam detection method which uses the representatives of substring classes, which are characteristic strings extracted from the document set. There are three measures for representatives, length, size, and maximin, and we call the methods with them the AM Len, the AM Siz, and the AM Max, respectively. They also propose a method for determining the threshold for their measures. Their methods then regard a document as spam if it contains a representative such as alien, which is an outlier of substrings in nomal documents.
·3 Results
Exp. 1: Computational efficiency.
First, we compared the implementation of LinearMO with a straightforward implementation of MO. The input document set D for this experiment is a concatenation of * 1 http://quote.yahoo.co.jp all the datasets. The total length ||D|| is 888360. Figure 7 shows the computation time for the whole spam detection and for the probability estimation. As shown in the graph, the computation time for LinearMO is more than four times faster than the straightforward implementation.
On the other hand, the total computation time is at most twice faster than that because the construction for suffix trees takes much time. The memory space consumption of the suffix tree of the whole D is about 29.7MB, including D itself.
Exp. 2: Basic Performance. Table 2 shows the recalls, precisions, and F-scores for all methods. As shown in the table, DCE and AM Siz achieved a high recall, DCE and Naive achieved high precision, and DCE achieved the highest F-score in all the datasets. Overall, DCE shows slightly better performance compared to other methods.
Exp. 3: Recall and Precision.
In this experiment, we did not use the methods to determine thresholds of each method. Instead, we output all documents as spam by ascending order of its document complexity and computed recalls and precisions. The graph in Figure 8 shows the recall and the precision curves of the dataset YF6830. To the left of the intersection of the precision and the recall of DCE, precision and recall are clearly higher than for any other methods. However, to the right of the intersection, the precision decreases faster than for the other methods. with probability p, where 1 ≤ j ≤ |d| is a random number. We call the probability the density of noise. To examine the effect of the density, we set the number of spams to 20. Figure 9 shows the recall rates against density. In Exp. 4 and 5, we redefine the recall by (detected noise spams / inserted noise spams). AM Siz was the best in the five algorithms. DCE were comparable to AM Siz when p ≤ 0.005. However, its recall decreased depending on the increase of the density. Exp. 5: Performance Against the Number of Spams.
In this experiment, we created noise spams by the same way as Exp. 4 with the density p = 0.02. Figure 10 shows the performance against the number m of inserted noise spams. AM Siz was the best when m ≤ 20, and DCE was the best when m > 20. According to the increase in the number of inserted spams, the performance of DCE showed improvement while the other methods did not improve. Exp. 6: Detecting Word Salads.
Spammers create word salads by replacing words in a skeleton document with some keywords. In this experiment, we created word salads and inserted them into the document set. The dataset used was YF4974. We created the keyword set by manually selecting from the dataset and selected a spam as the skeleton in YF8473. The keyword set consisted of 25 nouns, and the skeleton consisted of 45 words. All nouns in the skeleton were replaced in the creation of the word salads. We then created these word salads and insert them into the dataset. Figure 11 shows the result. As well as Exp. 4 and 5, we define the recall by (detected word salads / inserted word salads). AM Siz detected about 20% of word salads despite only a few word salads being inserted. However, the recall increased up to only 30%. DCE detected more word salads when the number m of word salads inserted was greater than 35. The recall was approximately 100% when m > 60. Since Naive only detects exact copies, it could not detect word salads. AM Len and AM Max could not detect word salads because their threshold values were relatively higher than AM Siz. We also show the precision in Figure 12 . In this experiment, we define the pcrecision by (number of original spams and word salads / number of reported documents). Since the threshold value of each method did not change significantly, the number of detected original spams was almost same as the experiment of Exp. 2. DCE and AM Siz slightly improved because they could detect word salads. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an unsupervised spam detection algorithm that calculates document complexity. The algorithm runs in linear time to the total length of the input documents. We also presented some experiment results for real and synthetic data; the real data were collected from popular bulletin boards and the synthetic data were generated artificially as word salad spam documents.
From the results of Exp. 6, it revealed that the performance of our method improves as the number of word salads increase, namely, as the cost of creating spams relatively goes down. Therefore we conclude that our method works successfully for such low complexity spams. As reported in [Sato 08 ], the ratio of splogs based on word salad to the whole splogs may be still low. However, it is always important to develop countermeasures against new and complicated spams in advance, since that spams which are hard to detect by existent methods, include query keywords, will increase rapidly on the Internet.
Very recently, Qian et al. [Qian 10 ] propose an unsupervised spam detection method, which has high performance to the level of state-of-the-art supervised methods. It is our future works to compare our method to such new methods [Qian 10, Jeong 10, Misra 08].
